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MCMANUS V. HORN: THE LEGALITY OF SETTING A SINGLE 
FORM OF BAIL 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People ex rel. McManus v. Horn1 
(decided March 22, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2012, the New York Court of Appeals came down 
with a decision that clarified the options given to a court in setting 
bail.2  The case, People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, was an appeal for 
the court to consider whether New York Criminal Procedure Law 
(“CPL”) section 520.10(2)(b) “prohibits a court from designating on-
ly one form of bail.”3  Both McManus and the District Attorney re-
lied on the language of the statute to argue their opposing points.4  
McManus argued that a single form of bail is illegal under the New 
York law, while the government argued that the law allows a judge to 
designate a single form of bail.5  This stark difference in statutory in-
terpretation required the court provide some clarification. 
In a 2007 case, the court stated that its “primary goal is to in-
terpret a statute by determining, and implementing, the Legislature’s 
intent.”6  This analysis begins with looking to the language chosen by 
the legislature in drafting the statute.7  Then, the court should look to 
the “purposes underlying the legislative scheme,” or in other words, 
legislative intent.8  The entire analysis should be conducted with his-
torical considerations in mind.9  While the surrounding circumstances 
 
1 18 N.Y.3d 660 (2012). 
2 Id. at 666. 
3 Id. at 662. 
4 Id. at 664-65. 
5 Id. at 664. 
6 People v. Litto, 8 N.Y.3d 692, 697 (2007). 
7 Id. at 697. 
8 Id.  
9 N.Y. STAT. LAW §124 (McKinney 2012). 
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will not control the plain, unambiguous text of the statute, it cannot 
simply be ignored.10  Additionally, the textual discussion should be 
followed by review of the litigation on the statute.11 
This Note on the recent Court of Appeals’ holding in 
McManus will examine how the court came to hold that New York 
law prohibits a court from fixing only one form of bail.12  Statutory 
language and legislative intent, considered in light of the extensive 
history of bail reform, help clarify how the court arrived at the con-
clusion it did.  This analysis will be followed by a review of the divi-
sion between several other states on the issue of allowing their courts 
to set a solitary form of bail.  Finally, a review of the implications of 
this decision, or lack thereof, will be discussed. 
II. MCMANUS V. HORN 
“Petitioner Shaun McManus was on parole . . . when he was 
arrested for arson . . . and related offenses stemming from two sepa-
rate incidents” against a common victim.13  McManus was accused of 
assaulting an individual and setting the same individual’s two cars on 
fire.14  “Bail was set at $5,000, cash or bond, . . . [and t]he victim was 
granted a temporary order of protection.”15  McManus posted bail, 
but subsequently violated the order of protection by verbally abusing 
the victim and threatening him with weapons.16  He was arraigned on 
new charges and bail was set at $1500, cash or bond, for each of-
fense, but he was not released on bail because the Division of Parole 
filed a violation warrant with the Department of Corrections.17  Based 
on the original incidents of arson and assault, McManus was indicted 
for two counts of arson, four counts of aggravated harassment, two 
counts of criminal mischief, and one count of assault.18  The “Su-
preme Court ordered that bail be set at $20,000, ‘CASH ONLY.’ ”19 
“When the Division of Parole [withdrew] its hold on [peti-
 
10 Id. 
11 U.S. v. Alvarez-Hernandez, 478 F.3d 1060, 1065-66 (2007). 
12 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 666. 
13 Id. at 662. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 663. 
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tioner], he tried to secure a bail bond but was” unsuccessful due to 
the fact that the court required bail be in the form of cash only.20  
McManus sought an alteration of his bail ruling, arguing that setting a 
single form of bail is not allowed under CPL section 520.10(2)(b), 
but the Supreme Court stuck to its bail determination.21  Petitioner 
then initiated a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus.22  The Su-
preme Court held that CPL 520.10(2)(b) does not preclude a judge 
from setting a single form of bail and the Appellate Division affirmed 
on the same grounds.23 
Before the Court of Appeals analyzed the merits of the case, it 
had to decide if the issue became moot when McManus entered a 
guilty plea to the arson and as to other charges.24  Petitioner’s pre-
trial detention was terminated upon this plea, so the legality of the de-
tention was technically a non-issue.25  However, the court found that 
a mootness exception applied because the issue of cash-only bail is 
important, likely to reoccur, and will typically evade review.26  As 
such, the case was not dismissed on mootness grounds, and the court 
proceeded with its interpretation of the statute.27 
The court first turned to the language used in the statute at is-
sue.28  In the first section of the statute, nine categories of bail are 
permitted.29  The second section of the statute “specifies two distinct 
‘methods of fixing bail.’ ”30  The first method allows the court to des-
ignate the monetary amount of bail without specifying the form in 
which it may be posted.31  If this option is employed, the accused can 
post the amount in any of the nine forms listed in the first section of 
the statute.32  The second method of fixing bail states that a “court 
may direct that the bail be posted in any one of two or more of the 








26 Id. at 663-64. 
27 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 664. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b) (McKinney 2012)). 
31 Id. 
32 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 664. 
3
Wynne: Setting a Single Form of Bail
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1540 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
may designate different amounts varying with the forms.”33 
McManus argued that a single form of bail, such as cash-only 
bail, is illegal under the statute because subdivision (2)(b) “requires 
that at least two forms of bail be” set.34  He relied on the language, 
“any one of two or more of the forms” to support his contentions.35  
The government countered by arguing that a single form of bail is 
permissible under CPL 520.10 because (2)(a) uses the word “form” 
not “forms,” and the word “may” and not “must” is used in both (a) 
and (b) of subdivision (2).36  The court conceded that both parties’ 
arguments had “some degree of linguistic merit,” and thus a legisla-
tive intent analysis would help decide which argument should pre-
vail.37  It held that McManus’ argument better conformed with the 
“overall statutory structure and legislative purpose” that impelled the 
enactment of the statute in question.38 
The word “may” was employed to categorize the two permis-
sible methods of fixing bail in subdivision (2).39  “The Legislature 
could not have used the word ‘must’ ” because that would have lim-
ited the court’s discretion in choosing between the two enumerated 
options.40  It was the intention of the legislature “to reform the restric-
tive bail scheme that existed [prior to the current statute] in order to 
improve the availability of pre-trial release.”41  In order to improve 
such availability, the legislature provided flexible bail alternatives to 
presumptively innocent pretrial detainees.42 
The court ended its decision by stating that the other forms of 
bail that must be set imposed no undue restriction on a court because 
the two forms of bail may be virtually indistinguishable from one an-
other.43  The court subsequently provided examples of how the court 
could have determined proper bail for McManus in conformity of 
CPL section 520.10.44  Along with the $20,000 cash option, the judge 
 








41 Id. (citations omitted).  
42 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665. 
43 Id. at 665-66. 
44 Id. at 666. 
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could have ordered a $200,000 partially secured appearance bond re-
quiring a monetary deposit of 10%, or a $20,000 secured appearance 
bond that could be satisfied with, among other things, $20,000 in 
cash.45  Therefore, the court concluded that there was no compelling 
reason for the legislature to allow a single form of bail in the stat-
ute.46  The judgment was reversed and the proceeding was converted 
to declaratory judgment declaring that CPL 520.10(2)(b) prohibits the 
designation of one form of bail.47 
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF CPL 520.10 
In its decision on McManus’ writ of habeas corpus, the Bronx 
County Supreme Court pointed out that “[t]here are no reported cases 
holding either that a court must set two forms of bail, or that setting 
one form is permissible.”48  However, it did acknowledge that in 
People v. Imran,49 the court stated that CPL 520.10(2)(b) allows a 
court to “delimit the options [for posting bail] by specifying at least 
two forms of bail.”50  Because the issue in Imran was whether a real 
estate bond posted by the defendant had to satisfy the double equity 
requirement for a secured bond set out in CPL 500.10(17)(b), and not 
whether two forms of bail is required under CPL 520.10(b)(2), the 
statement of the court is simply dicta.51  In order to discern whether 
the Court of Appeals was justified in overturning the lower court’s 
interpretation of the statute, an analysis of the history, language used, 
and legislative intent is necessary. 
 
A. Text of CPL section 520.10(2) 
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 520.10(2) reads: 
2. The methods of fixing bail are as follows: 
(a) A court may designate the amount of the bail with-




47 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 666. 
48 People ex rel. Meis v. Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d 392 (2009). 
49 People v. Iman, 754 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2002). 
50 Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (quoting Imran, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 161) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
51 Id. 
5
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posted.  In such case, the bail may be posted in either 
of the forms specified in paragraphs (g) and (h) of 
subdivision one; 
(b) The court may direct that the bail be posted in any 
one of two or more of the forms specified in subdivi-
sion one, designated in the alternative, and may desig-
nate different amounts varying with the forms[.]52 
This language has been read in two very distinct ways.53  The 
decisions of the three courts that ruled on the McManus case exem-
plify the distinction.54 
The difference of opinion starts with the interpretation of the 
introductory text of subdivision two.55  One way of reading “[t]he 
methods of fixing bail are as follows[]” is that the two subdivisions 
that follow are the only options available to a court in setting bail.56  
Another way of reading the text is that the court can set bail in the 
two methods described in the subdivisions, but taking into account 
the permissive language used in those subdivisions, they are not the 
only ways bail may be set.57  The proponents of this latter view pro-
pose that if the legislature intended the subdivisions to be the only 
means of setting bail, they would have used language such as “when 
fixing bail, a court must do so” in either manner set out in subdivision 
(a) or (b), or alternatively, “the only methods of fixing bail permitted 
are” those in the following subdivisions.58  However, the Court of 
Appeals held that “inclusion of the word ‘may’ in both subdivisions 
was the simplest way for the legislature to codify the two permissible 
methods for fixing bail[.]”59  If the legislature had chosen to use the 
word “must” instead of “may,” the statute would have eliminated the 
discretion given to the court, which it did not want to do.60 
Subdivision (a) includes the words “form or forms,” suggest-
 
52 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2). 
53 Compare McManus, 18 N.Y.3d 660, with Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d 392.  In McManus, the 
Court of Appeals found the statute required the court to set a minimum of two forms of bail 
while in Horn, the Supreme Court, Bronx County, found that the statute permitted the court 
to set one form of bail if it so choses. 
54 Id. 
55 Horn, 888 N.Y.S.2d at 394. 
56 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665. 
60 Id. 
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ing that it is permissible for a court to designate a single form.61  This 
language can also be read as allowing the court to designate a single 
amount of bail, but not a single form of bail attached to that single 
amount.62 
The opposing views of the nature of the text underlie these in-
terpretations of the language chosen by the legislature.  If the lan-
guage is taken as being permissive, a single form and amount of bail 
may be set, but conversely if the language is read as being restrictive 
of the discretion of the court, a single form of bail is precluded.  
Thus, the plain language is not definitive enough for an analysis to 
rest upon.  As the Court of Appeals stated over a decade ago, “Where 
the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the 
courts will adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional 
doubts or other objectionable results.”63  In order to distinguish which 
view would avoid injustice, the text of the statute must be interpreted 
in light of conditions existing at the time of its enactment so as to de-
cipher the intentions of the legislature in using the words chosen.64 
B. Historical Perspective 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution de-
mands that excessive bail not be ordered.65  However, nowhere in the 
Constitution is there a specified right to bail.66 
The English law concerning bail undoubtedly influenced the 
drafters of the Constitution.67  The Petition of Right predetermined 
which crimes were bailable and which crimes were not.68  This stat-
ute took away from the sheriffs the discretion, which was often 
abused, of determining in which situations to set bail.69  With no pen-




63 In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 667 (1995) (quoting Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v. 
Miller Harness Co., 80 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
64 Litto, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
66 Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 968 
(1965). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 967. 
69 Id. 
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continued.70  In response, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provided 
the procedures for proceedings that would hold violators subject to 
penalties.71  The principles of the Act influenced Article I, section 9 
of the Constitution, which sets forth the principle of habeas corpus.72  
A decade later, the English Bill of Rights set a prohibition against ex-
cessive bail.73  The language used in this bill of rights can be seen to-
day in the Eighth Amendment.74  However, notably missing is the in-
fluence of the Petition of Right.75 
Bail rights developed entirely separately from English influ-
ence as well.  One such influence was the development of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, enacted by the first Congress.76  The Act specified 
that all non-capital offenses are bailable, but bail determinations for 
capital offenses are left to the discretion of the presiding judge.77  
Congress later enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1966 that grants a 
statutory right to non-capital defendants of pretrial release on their 
own recognizance or personal bond.78  However, if there is a deter-
mination that these measures will not assure appearance at trial, al-
ternative conditions such as travel constraints may be placed on the 
defendant.79  A highly controversial part of the act was that a judge 
was not allowed to consider the accused’s danger to society in non-
capital cases; only flight risk could be considered.80  This changed in 
1984 when Congress replaced the Bail Reform Act of 1966 with 
United States Code, title 18, sections 3141-3150, allowing courts to 
detain pretrial defendants if it is determined they pose a danger to the 
community through clear and convincing evidence.81  The United 
States Code did not do away with the Bail Reform Act’s attempt “to 
de-emphasize the use of monetary bail and to encourage judges to 
consider nonmonetary release conditions.”82 
 
70 Id. 
71 Foote, supra note 66, at 967. 




76 Foote, supra note 66, at 971. 
77 Kenneth Frederick Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 687 (1985). 
78 U.S. v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 170 (1969). 
79 Id. at 170-71. 
80 Id. at 171. 
81 Ray Del Castillo & Gihan Fernando, Bail, 77 GEO. L.J. 786, 787-88 (1989). 
82 State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 350 (Minn. 2000). 
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The Constitution of New York State codified its own law 
against excessive bail in article I, section 5,83 but just as the Federal 
Constitution grants no affirmative right to bail, the state constitution 
does not either.84  Criminal Procedure Law section 510.30(2) requires 
a court to consider aspects such as the individual’s character, reputa-
tion, employment, financial resources, criminal record, residency, 
weight of evidence against him, and possible sentence upon convic-
tion, when determining bail.85  The law also provides that if the of-
fense charged is a misdemeanor, bail must be set, but if the offense is 
a felony, the court has the discretion of choosing between setting bail 
or detaining the individual after the district attorney is notified and 
the court has reviewed the criminal record of the individual.86  How-
ever, if the felony is a class A felony or the individual has two prior 
felony convictions, bail is not permitted.87 
When a change to the language of a statute is made, a change 
in the law is presumed.88  Due to confusion and inadequate awareness 
of the proper scheme in setting bail, the state legislature enacted CPL 
Article 500 in 1971.89  The provisions discussed above, the one at is-
sue in the McManus case, and several others were codified through 
this legislation.90  There have been two modifications of section 
520.10 subsequent to the 1971 enactment.  When first enacted, sec-
tion 520.10(2)(a) was read to limit the defendant’s selection of the 
form of bail he or she wished to post when the court failed to specify 
itself.91  The defendant could only select the forms in paragraphs (a) 
through (d) of subdivision one, which were the most burdening 
forms.92  In 1972, the legislature amended subsection (2)(a) by re-
placing the choice between the forms stipulated in (a), (b), (c), or (d) 
to the choice of either form (g) or (h).93  Then in 1986, the legislature 
added the option of posting bail through “credit card or similar de-
 
83 People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. 1943). 
84 Id. 
85 People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 555 (1969). 
86 Id. at 554. 
87 Id. 
88 N.Y. STAT. LAW §124. 
89 Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, 69-Oct. N.Y. 
ST. B.J. 8, 9 (1997). 
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vice” as the ninth authorized form of bail.94 
C. Legislative Intent 
In light of the plain language as well as historical and legisla-
tive development of bail schemes both in the country and in New 
York State, the legislative intent behind the statutes can begin to be 
construed.  It was recognized that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 “was 
an effort by Congress to give meaning to some of our highest ideals 
of injustice.  It was, by common consent, a legislative intervention in 
a field where reform was badly needed.”95  One of the highest ideals 
of injustice Congress was concerned with was the idea that the ac-
cused are considered innocent until proven guilty.96  If this is to be 
true, imprisoning the accused before trial may be hard to justify. 
The 1972 amendment to CPL 520.10 relaxed the restrictions 
on the forms of bail that could be posted.97  The legislature adopted 
this amendment in order to “provide a method of release somewhere 
between bail . . . and release on one’s own recognizance.”98  The leg-
islature was hoping to reduce the number of imprisoned individuals 
who are not convicted.99  The Mayor of New York, John V. Lindsay, 
wrote to the Governor, Nelson A. Rockefeller, urging him to approve 
the amendment.100  Lindsay believed the amendment would create a 
presumption in favor of pretrial release and reduce the role of 
bondsmen, thus making it possible for more defendants to obtain pre-
trial release.101  Through adopting the amendments, it can be viewed 
as the legislature intending to provide more feasible opportunities to 
the accused in meeting their bail requirements and obtaining pretrial 
release.102  This in turn would help the government with the problem 
of overcrowded prisons and large caseloads.103 
 
94 Id. 
95 Leathers, 412 F.2d at 170. 
96 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665. 
97 Bellamy v. Judges in N.Y. City Crim. Ct., 41 A.D.2d 196, 202 (1973). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Letter from John V. Lindsay, Mayor of New York, to Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor 
of the State of New York (May 24, 1972). 
101 Id. 
102 Bellamy, 41 A.D.2d at 202. 
103 Letter from John H. Hughes, Chairman, Committee on Judiciary, to Michael 
Whiteman, Executive Chamber (May 18, 1972). 
10
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The second revision in 1986 added section 520.10(1)(i), 
which is the ninth form of authorized bail forms.104  The provision al-
lowed the use of credit cards for bail payments.105  However, a year 
later it was amended to apply only in vehicular and traffic law viola-
tions.106  This restriction remained in place until 2005, when it was 
removed from the statute.107  Presently, the ninth form of bail, the use 
of credit cards, is authorized for any violation, not just traffic and ve-
hicular offenses.108  It should also be noted that CPL section 520.15 
grants the defendant the option of posting cash bail, even when the 
form of cash was not specified as acceptable when bail was set.109 
The removal of restrictions on forms of bail, the additions of 
more forms of bail, including less onerous forms of bail, and the sep-
arate legislation always permitting cash bail tend to show that the leg-
islature intended to grant the accused as many feasible opportunities 
as possible to meet bail.  If the legislature was truly unconcerned 
about the accused getting adequate and feasible opportunities of post-
ing bail, it would not have continued to enact legislation in three out 
of the past four decades.110 
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ HOLDINGS ON CASH-ONLY BAIL 
In 2002, a criminal court in Kings County held that CPL sec-
tion 520.10(1) gives the court many bail options, and the court may 
“delimit the options by specifying at least two forms of bail.”111  Al-
so, in a Commission on Judicial Conduct in 2004, the committee 
found that a town judge committed misconduct, among other things, 
by sending a defendant to jail for two weeks because he could not 
meet the set bail of $500 cash.112  The commission declared that the 
“Criminal Procedure Law requires that bail be set in more than one 
form.”113  Other than these few comments on the permissibility of 
cash-only, there have been few decisions on the permissibility of 
 




108 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(1)(i). 
109 Id. at § 520.15. 
110 Id. at § 520.10. 
111 Imran, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 160. 
112 N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Cond., 2004 WL 2213862, at *3. 
113 Id. 
11
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courts to set cash-only bail.  Therefore, it is useful to look to other 
states and see how they have dealt with the issue.  While each state 
has the freedom to enact their own statutory scheme of setting bail, 
the whole country adheres to the fundamental concept that individu-
als are innocent until proven guilty.114  As such, the different interpre-
tations of the fundamental fairness and legality of cash-only bail set-
ting in other states is meaningful to New York State. 
A. States that Found Cash-Only Bail Permissible 
Arizona,115 Alabama,116 and Iowa117 have held that cash only 
bail is permissible.  Iowa was the first of these states to determine the 
legality of the single form bail determination in the 2003 case of State 
v. Briggs.118  The court followed the same statutory interpretation 
method as the court in McManus did by looking to the language used 
in light of historical background and legislative intent.119  However, 
the Iowa statute is broader than New York’s, only guaranteeing the 
accused the right to “sufficient sureties” and non-excessive bail.120  
The court held that the purpose of the “sufficient sureties” clause was 
to “guarantee a bailable individual access to a surety of some 
form”121 and not necessarily any form.122  It was conceded that it was 
conceivable for cash-only bail to violate the clause prohibiting exces-
sive bail, but because the defendant had been charged with the same 
offense four times in one year and previously failed to show up for 
court, the imposition of cash-only bail was found to be non-excessive 
in reasonably assuring the defendant’s presence at trial.123  The dis-
sent was very concerned that if the judges were given the discretion 
to set a single form of bail, they could in effect detain the accused.124  
If a defendant has no real estate and the judge can require putting up 
real estate to secure release, the effect is a denial of sufficient sure-
 
114 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). 
115 Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 429 (2005). 
116 Ex parte Singleton, 902 So.2d 132, 134 (Ala. 2004). 
117 State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 574 (Iowa 2003). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 578. 
120 Id. at 577. 
121 Id. at 581. 
122 Briggs, 666 N.W.2d at 582. 
123 Id. at 584. 
124 Id. at 586. 
12
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ties.125  The same can be said for cash-only bail determinations when 
the defendant has no cash.126 
Two years later, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Fragoso v. 
Fell127 interpreted its own “sufficient sureties” clause in the same way 
as the Iowa court did in Briggs.128  The court held that the term “suf-
ficient” gives the judge discretion to impose conditions necessary to 
ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial.129  However, the court 
concluded with a cautionary statement emphasizing that “nothing in 
this decision should be interpreted as blanket authority for cash-only 
bail.”130  The judge is still under the obligation to set the least burden-
some condition that will reasonably guarantee the accused’s presence 
at trial.131 
The Alabama Court of Appeals in Ex parte Harold Single-
ton132 relied heavily on the Briggs decision when it decided that “suf-
ficient sureties” allowed a judge to set cash-only bail.133  In fact, the 
court quoted the Briggs decision in almost all of its discussion on 
why it cannot hold that the Alabama Constitution prohibits a judge 
from setting cash-only bail.134  It held that it had the same views as 
the Iowa court on the discretion that should be given to the judges.135 
B. States that have Found Cash-Only Bail 
Impermissible 
Montana,136 Ohio,137 Tennessee,138 Minnesota,139 and Ver-




127 210 Ariz. 427 (2005). 
128 Id. at 432. 
129 Id. at 433. 
130 Id. at 434. 
131 Id. 
132 902 So.2d 132 (Ala. 2004). 
133 Id. at 135. 
134 Id. at 134-35. 
135 Id. at 134. 
136 State v. Rodriguez, 192 Mont. 411, 418-19 (1981). 
137 State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon, 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 117 (1993). 
138 Lewis Bail Bond Co. v. Gen. Session Ct. of Madison County, No. C-97-62, 1997 WL 
711137, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12 1997). 
139 State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 346 (2000). 
140 State v. Hance, 180 Vt. 357, 358 (2006). 
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in which some of these courts interpret the historical background and 
intention of setting pretrial bail differs from the courts in Iowa, Ari-
zona and Alabama.141  This difference in interpretation lead to differ-
ent conclusions on the permissibility of cash-only bail. 
In State v. Hance,142 the Vermont court looked to the history 
of “sufficient sureties” and concluded that the clause’s primary pur-
pose is to protect the liberty interest of the accused while also serving 
the court’s interest in securing the appearance of the individual at tri-
al.143  The inclusion of the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty is 
markedly absent from the Arizona court’s interpretation of the pur-
pose of bail in Fragroso.144  When considering the interests of the ac-
cused and the interests of the government, the court found that the 
distinction between cash-only bail and a secured appearance bond on-
ly affects the accused’s interests, and not the government’s, because 
both forms of bail serve the court’s interest in securing the accused’s 
appearance.145  In Hance, the court also had a similar argument as 
that of the dissent in Briggs, stating, “permitting cash-only bail would 
increase government power to engage in pre-trial confinement.”146  
That argument proved relevant again in the Tennessee court’s opin-
ion of Lewis Bail Bond Company v. General Sessions Court of Madi-
son County147 and the Minnesota court’s opinion in State v. Brooks.148 
The Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex. Rel. Jones v. Hen-
don149 also took up the issue of state and individual interests in setting 
cash-only bail.150  The court held that because the judge has the dis-
cretion to impose conditions on a bond, there is no legitimate purpose 
for designating the form in which it may be posted.151  It went on to 
conclude that “the only apparent purpose in requiring a ‘cash-only’ 
bond to the exclusion of other forms . . . is to restrict the accused’s 
access to surety, and thus, to detain the accused” which would be a 
 
141 Id. at 365-66. 
142 180 Vt. 357. 
143 Id. at 363. 
144 Id. at 366. 
145 Id. at 360-61. 
146 Id. at 364. 
147 Lewis Bail Bond Co., 1997 WL 711137, at *5. 
148 Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 353. 
149 66 Ohio St.3d 115. 
150 Id. at 117-18. 
151 Id. at 118. 
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violation of state law.152  This conclusion that the only interest in set-
ting cash-only bail is an unlawful one left the legislature to clarify the 
discretion of judges in setting bail. 
In 1998, the Ohio legislature amended the state’s constitution, 
making two major changes.153  First, the amendment allowed the 
court to deny bail to an individual charged with a felony where there 
is great proof or assumption of guilt and the individual poses a seri-
ous risk of harm to the community.154  Second, the amendment al-
lowed the court to determine “at any time the type, amount, and con-
ditions of bail” when an individual is charged with an offense they 
can be imprisoned for.155  The Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith v. 
Leis156 found that the amendment did not change the determination 
that cash-only bail is impermissible.157  While the amendment did ex-
pand the court’s discretion in denying bail in certain circumstances, it 
did not limit the forms of bail an individual can post when bail is 
granted.158 
The court in McManus used much of the same logic as the 
Ohio court did in Hendon.159  The existence of other alternative 
methods of ensuring the accused’s presence at trial leads to the con-
clusion that the only interest being affected by a decision to not allow 
single-form bail setting is the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty.160  
When conducting an analysis and making a determination on the in-
terpretation of a law it is important for courts to consider the effect 
their decision will have on the government, individuals and society as 
a whole. 
V. EFFECT OF MCMANUS 
The pretrial stage of litigation has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court as the “most critical period” for the accused.161  The 
ability of a defendant to prepare for his or her defense is very differ-
 
152 Id. 
153 Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 315-16 (2005). 
154 Id. at 316. 
155 Id. 
156 106 Ohio St.3d 309. 
157 Id. at 318. 
158 Id. at 319-20. 
159 Compare McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665-66, with Hendon, 66 Ohio St.3d at 118. 
160 Hendon, 66 Ohio St.3d at 118. 
161 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
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ent if they are detained rather than free.  Thus, it seems that the 
McManus decision will have the most notable effect on defendants 
who are unable to post bail and must remain incarcerated until their 
trial due to a lack of financial means. 
Defendants will now have the option of posting bail in a min-
imum of two forms.  If the judge declares a monetary amount for bail 
but does not specify a form, the defendant may choose to post that 
amount through an unsecured surety bond, an unsecured appearance 
bond, or cash.162  If the judge chooses to specify the form and amount 
of bail, he or she must do so by designating two alternative forms;163 
a judge may no longer specify one amount and one form.164  The 
court believes the options given to the defendant in choosing the form 
to post will help further the legislature’s intent of improving the 
availability of pretrial release.165  However, the prohibition on single-
form bond determinations may not improve a defendant’s ability to 
obtain pretrial release as much as the court hopes because the two 
forms of bail may be equally unattainable. 
The McManus decision makes it clear that if a court decides 
that $20,000 cash bail is what it will take to secure the defendant’s 
presence at trial, it may set bail in accordance with §520.10(2)(b) by 
requiring either $20,000 cash or in the alternative a $200,000 partial-
ly secured appearance bond requiring a monetary deposit of 10%, 
which equates to $20,000.166  Thus, if a defendant does not have 
$20,000 in cash, he or she will not be able to post either of the alter-
native forms.  Allowing courts to set such “virtually indistinguisha-
ble” forms of bail, it can hardly be seen as serving the underlying 
purpose of section 520, which is “providing flexible bail alternatives 
to pretrial detainees—who are presumptively innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”167 
The inability to provide sufficient collateral to secure a bail 
bond is just one of the problems a defendant may face when trying to 
secure pretrial release.168  Another problem will occur when bail is set 
 
162 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 520.10(2)(a). 
163 Id. § 520.10(2)(b). 
164 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 666. 
165 Id. at 665. 
166 Id. at 666. 
167 Id. at 665-66. 
168 Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another Alternative to New 
York’s Bail Bond Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 310-11 (2010). 
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low.169  A bondsperson will profit “approximately $345 on a $5,000 
bond, $150 on a $2,000 bond, and $75 on a $1,000 bond.”170  While 
defendants may be able to provide enough collateral to secure a bond, 
they may have trouble finding a bondsperson willing to put in the 
time, effort and risk for such little profit.171 
Shaun McManus is fortunate that his case came before the 
Court of Appeals when it did, because less than a month later the 
State Senate passed legislation that gave judges more factors to con-
sider when setting bail.172  The legislation, known as “Jilly’s Law,” 
would allow the judge to consider the safety of the victim, severity of 
offense and severity of injuries suffered through the offense.173  The 
bill was sent to the Assembly on April 18, 2012, after the Senate ap-
proved it.  Had “Jilly’s Law” been passed before McManus was ar-
raigned, the judge could have considered the safety of the victim he 
threatened and the severity of his offense.174  The judge could also 
have considered the fact that McManus previously violated a court 
order of protection.175  Section four, subdivision five of the proposed 
law gives the court the discretion to deny bail if there is substantial 
evidence to support the charge and clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant is a danger to the victim, community, or them-
selves.176  Under these considerations, McManus could have been de-
tained and the determination of cash-only bail would still be unde-
termined in the New York courts. 
The decision in McManus v. Horn, the possibility of “Jilly’s 
Law” becoming effective, and the overcrowding of New York state 
and county prisons177 are all indicators that the state’s bail scheme is 
becoming an issue that needs to be addressed sooner rather than later.  
The Court in McManus believes its decision will help alleviate some 
 
169 Id. at 310. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 310-11. 
172 Senate Passes Legislation Giving Courts Greater Criteria for Granting Bail, 




175 S. 259, 2011 Sess., available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S259-2011. 
176 Id. 
177 Ritchie to Host Special Meeting on Jail Overcrowding (Oct. 12, 2012), NEW YORK 
SENATE, available at http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/ritchie-host-special-meeting-
jail-overcrowding. 
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of the issues in the scheme by providing flexible bail alternatives.178  
However, setting alternative forms of bail in certain circumstances 
can be just as restricting as setting a single form of bail.179  What the 
McManus decision leaves for future legislation and judicial proceed-
ings to deal with is whether a choice between two unattainable bail 







178 McManus, 18 N.Y.3d at 665. 
179 Id. at 666. 
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